What all discussions of the problem appear to share, however, is the idea that the public's participation (and, by inference, its interest) focuses not on technical-scientific issues but on issues concerning policy values.
I shall suggest a shift of focus to a set of technical-scientific and, in particular, statistical issues for increasing the public's ability to understand and resolve controversies involving hazards. Stressing the importance of such scientific issuesespecially if statistical complexity is involvedis not usually seen to go hand in hand with the aim of promoting democratic control of policy. Technical-scientific complexity, it is often argued, is precisely what precludes lor at least discourages) participation by the lay public. If, however, social values are to be reflected adequately in hazard regulations, then the public must be given tools for understanding and criticizing the statistical hazard assessments underlying them. I am not suggesting that laypersons be taught the formal techniques found in statistics texts. The ability to apply formal rules (or "recipes") does not confer the critical astuteness needed for effective public influence. The rules needed for critically examining statistical hazard assessments are, in fact, one level removed from mathematical statistics itself.
Thus they may be referred to as metastatistical tools.
In this article, I shall develop two metastatistical tools and demonstrate their value for resolving a problem in hazard assessment which is often at the heart of policy controversies-namely, the problem of interpreting what negative statistical results indicate about the true extent of a sub-stance's hazard. My strategy will be first to discuss in a general fashion the problem of participation and to suggest how it might be tackled. Next, I will illustrate the problem by reference to a specific case study, and then I will develop and apply a set of metastatistical tools to that case.
I am focusing this article on the nature of metastatistical tools and their value for public participation. I do not intend to recommend how the resulting participation is to be implemented or how the participants should be chosen (see Note 40}. Although these latter issues must also be addressed in a complete metastatistical program, the tools themselves are primary regardless of how the logistics of participation are sorted out. Most importantly, the nature of these tools determines the role it is plausible to expect the public to play.2
Carrying out such a metastatistical program requires considerations from diverse fields and is a task uniquely suited to work in interdisciplinary studies of science. By pursuing this task, science studies can play a dynamic and socially significant role in promoting effective public influence in shaping policies and resolving controversies.
The Growing Problem of Public Participation and the Metastatistics of Hazard Stages of Hazard Analysis
Hazard analysis is a multi-faceted enterprise that can be divided into three very broad stages: 1) data generation, 2) hazard assessment, and 3) hazard evaluation.3 Data generation includes (retrospective) casecontrol studies, and (prospective) randomized treatment-control experiments. For example, many studies were conducted in the 1960s and 1970s to obtain data on the hazards associated with oral contraceptives. One of the most controversial hazards investigated was that of thromboembolic diseases.
On the basis of data collected in such studies, statements of the hazards associated with the substance in question are made. Typical examples of hazard assessments are found in the reports on oral contraceptives by the Advisory Committee to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1966 and 1969, respectively:
The data .. . are not adequate to confirm or refute the role of oral contraceptives in thromboembolic disease. They do, however, suggest that if oral contraceptives act as a cause they do so very infrequently relative to the number of users.4
The fact remains that in the prospective trials of oral contraceptives [reported in a given study], no excess risk of thromboembolism has been shown.5
These hazard assessments can be distinguished from subsequent hazard evaluations, which explicitly involve weighing benefits against risk. On the basis of the hazard assessments of the pill, for example, the 1966 Advisory Committee to the FDA made the following hazard evaluation: "The committee finds no adequate scientific data, at this time, proving these compounds unsafe for human use."6 The notion of "safety" is acknowledged to involve weighing benefits against risk, and the follow-up FDA report in 1969 makes the consideration of benefits explicit:
When these potential hazards and the value of the drugs are balanced, the Committee finds the ratio of benefit to risk sufficiently high to justify the designation safe within the intent of legislation.7
Relating hazard assessments to hazard evaluations, and to any subsequent policies, involves a deliberate and explicit injection of various societal policy values. As is typical for such evaluations, the FDA Advisory Committee's evaluations gave rise to such controversial policy questions as: What is the meaning of the double negative "no proof of unsafety" or of "safe within the intent of legislation"? How are benefits to be weighed against risks, and to whom should these apply?
In contrast, the entry of values in relating data to hazard assessments is rarely made explicit, if it is not wholly denied. A common idealized view of hazard analysis is the following: A qualified expert makes a value-free assessment of the hazards involved; societal groups indicate the values they attach to certain hazards; and then, by some means appropriately sensitive to the two components, a hazard evaluation is reached. Echoing this ideal, Howard Raiffa, in a report to the National Academy of Sciences, argues that hazard assessments should meet the following criterion: The problem, as I see it, is this: The hazard analyses with the most openings for injecting value judgments (and thus most acutely threatened by bias and controversy) are those based on incomplete or inaccurate data.1? Yet these analyses rest on hazard assessments depending heavily on scientific, especially statistical, expertise and are densely shrouded in technical-statistical complexities. So, on the one hand, the area of statistical hazard assessment justifies the strongest arguments for public participation (as it has many openings for value-judgments). But on the other hand, it is an area in which the lay public is in the weakest position to participate-at least at present.
Lack of statistical knowledge, if it does not keep the public out of technically intensive controversies entirely, is likely to render attempted public intervention ineffectual or actually counterproductive. As Baruch Fischoff and his colleagues remark:
Citizens in a democratic society will eventually interfere with decisions in which they do not feel represented. When lay people do force their way into hazard decisions, their vehemence and technical naivete may leave the paid professionals aghast, reinforcing suspicions that the public is stupid.11
To forestall such mutual incomprehension, the public (or its representatives) requires an understanding of the statistical evidence of hazards associated with hazard evaluations.
Instead of encouraging a careful look at the nature and role of statistical evidence, however, the increasing awareness that values may enter at all stages of hazard analysis has tended to deflect attention away from the statistical-scientific issues in resolving controversial hazard assessments. The political and scientific communities have failed to recognize that in minimizing scientificstatistical issues the problem of effective public participation is exacerbated.
Why Decreasing Emphasis on Issues of Evidence Increases the Problem of Participation
The key problems of public participation revolve around the public's inability to hold expert risk assessors accountable to the policy values of society. And, ironically, finding that hazard assessments may ultimately depend on policy values seems to have helped free the experts from being held responsible for their assessments. For one thing, the view that conflicting hazard assessments largely reflect conflicting policy values provides a warrant for denying the validity of any assessment leading to policies deemed unfavorable. Individuals are encouraged to view "expert scientific support" as something that can be enlisted for any position whatever. Methods of statistical hazard assessment are regarded with general mistrust, rather than as instruments for adjudicating controversial assessments objectively.12 Moreover, if disagreements over hazard assessments are viewed as primarily disagreements over policy values, there would seem to be little justification for criticizing an expert assessment as irresponsible or incompetent on objective scientific grounds. This situation provides regulatory agencies with a convenient defense against criticisms when their hazard assessments prove to be inaccurate.13 But, as I shall argue, the values appropriate at the stage of hazard assessment are scientific and evidential, not political. As such, there often is genuine warrant for criticizing hazard assessments as invalid, and hazard assessors as incompetent or biased interpreters of data. Unable to scrutinize the evidence underlying assessments, the public-as well as many judges, lawyers, regulators, and scientists-is unable to express such criticisms. As Marcel La Follette correctly notes: when policymakers and the public become impatient with expert dissensus, they often lack sufficient understanding of the reasons for such disagreement and rarely are able to argue effectively ... A strong case for efforts to establish such understanding can be made for scientists, lawyers, and policymakers as well as for the public .... 14 And this understanding requires a means for distinguishing hazard assessments that are prejudged by policy values from those warranted by the evidence. Given its importance for participation, why has this understanding not been forthcoming? A rather disturbing, but no doubt partly correct, explanation is given in an article by Marc Roberts, Stephen Thomas, and Michael Dowling: Given the widespread use of statistical methods in science, most individuals tend to assume that their logical basis is not a subject of controversy, and that they are well understood by those who employ them. This is not true. The validity of even the most routinely used methods is the subject of enormous confusion and philosophical controversy.16 Conflicting hazard assessments, and the problem of adjudicating them, are closely connected to the statistical and philosophical controversies over the possibility of interpreting statistical results objectively. The way in which these controversies intertwine is very poorly understood by both the experts and the lay public.
The problem as usually perceived is this: Using statistical methods to reach hazard assessments requires "extra-statistical" judgments as to what data to collect, how large a sample to take, and what level of reliability to use. Most philosophers of statistics maintain that these judgments are necessarily subjective, reflecting pragmatic and, in this case, policy value considerations.17 Since any resulting statistical reports depend on these subjective choices, they too are necessarily colored by subjective policy values-or so many philosophers argue. If one accepts this argument, conflicts over hazard assessments should be treated as conflicts over policy value.
But this argument is erroneous; and conflating conflicts over hazard assessments and conflicts over policy values is a mistake. The judgments required in applying statistical methods to reach hazard assessments may reflect policy values, conventions, pragmatic considerations, or other factors. But it does not follow that given the statistical method chosen, the question of whether a hazard assessment is warranted by the evidence need also be infected with the subjective values of the earlier judgments. Whether data warrant an assessment is an empirical question to which an objective answer can often be given;18 (that is, it may well meet Raiffa's criterion: "Free from the values of policy values").
A crude analogy may help. My interest in whether I have gained as little as one-half pound may be a matter of my subjective values. But whether a scale with a digital read-out in whole pounds, say, is a good tool for finding this out is not a matter of my subjective values. Neither is it a matter of pure logic. It involves empirical matters about the scale, the weighing conditions, my typical weight fluctuations, and so on. Whether or not a change in weight is detected depends on the type of scale chosen for the task. But given the scale chosen (as well as the weighing conditions), whether or not a gain is detected depends on how much I have actually gained! For this reason, knowledge of this dependency enables learning about my weight gain from the scale reading and expressing an interest in detecting a certain gain in terms of the scale that should be used. Hazard assessments of this type may be abbreviated as No-Increase or NI-assessments. Because such hazard assessments are often the source of controversy, it is desirable to develop a general set of tools for their clarification.
NI-assessments assert that, on average, the incidence of the hazard among those exposed to the treatment in question is no higher than the incidence of the hazard were they not so exposed (or were they exposed to some other treatment). But rarely is it possible to undo the treatment to observe what would have occurred if none of the experimental subjects had been given the treatment. When possible, what is done in such cases is carry out a comparative random experiment.21
The idea of a comparative random experiment is, roughly, to assign the treatment randomly to half of the subjects studied, leaving the other half (the control group) untreated. At the end of the experiment, the average (i.e., the mean) numbers of subjects showing the effect of interest in the two groups are compared. In the Fuertes' study, from 1961 to 1969, approximately 10,000 women were randomly assigned to either the treated group, where women were given an oral contraceptive or the control group, where women were given a different method of contraception. Each group contained approximately 5,000 women. At the end of the study, nine of the 5,000 treated and eight of the 5,000 not treated were found to have had a blood-clotting disease.23 The observed (positive) difference, then, was 1/5000 (or 0.0002).
For a number of reasons, the methods by which such observed differences lead to assessments of "no (significant) increase" in hazard (i.e., NIassessments) are statistical. First, the NI-assessment refers to two experimental populations of women: one where all take the pill and one where none do. The treated and control groups actually observed, however, only constitute samples from each. Second, numerous factors other than an oral contraceptive may cause or prevent blood-clotting diseases; so the difference observed may be due to these factors and not strictly to the presence or absence of the treatment of interest. As a result, the observed difference does not logically entail the NI-assessment. The data is first used to reach a statistical report; then that report leads to the NI-assessment. In the Fuertes' study, as in most studies of this type, this is accomplished by a test of the statistical significance of differences.
This test itself, of course, requires that certain assumptions be met by the study actually performed; and these assumptions must be checked in scrutinizing an NI-assessment. Such scrutiny calls for a separate analysis that I will not address here, but this separate analysis will itself involve running various tests of the significance of dif-ferences.24 So, for either analysis, the place to start is with the significance test.
A Test of the Statistical Significance of Differences
A test of the significance of differences sets up a statistical hypothesis, H, the null hypothesis. In the Fuertes' study, the null hypothesis is that an oral contraceptive has a "null" effect on a woman's chance of suffering blood-clotting disorders:
H: The probable (mean) incidence of clotting disorders in women treated (with the pill) does not exceed the probable incidence among the controls.
So the null hypothesis asserts that any observed difference in clotting rates in the sample of treated and control subjects is merely due to accidental fluctuations.
The test consists of a rule that specifies which of the possible observed differences is to be taken as rejecting the null hypothesis. Rejecting H in this context is tantamount to accepting an alternative hypothesis, J, which in this case asserts that there is some positive increase in the incidence of blood-clotting disorders among women taking oral contraceptives.25 A rejection of H is a positive result; a failure to reject is a negative one. The observation of any positive difference in incidence-even if quite large-is logically consistent with the truth of the null hypothesis H. But H asserts that "large" differences are rare. Using statistical knowledge, it is possible to calculate how frequently a difference as large as, or larger than, the one observed would arise, assuming that the null hypothesis H is true. This is the significance level of the observed difference, often referred to as its p-value. How small should a significance level be required to be before the null hypothesis (of zero increase) is rejected? Conventional choices are 0.05 and 0.01; but the justification for these levels (as opposed to, say, 0.08 or 0.03) is known to be controversial (see Note 161. Still, there is little lif any) dispute that unless a significance level is reasonably small (say, 0.15 or less) the result does not warrant rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., it does not warrant a positive result). For the significance level equals the chance that such a rejection is a false positive; and an inference with a high chance of being in error is not felt to be warranted.
What is the significance level of the difference observed in the Fuertes' study? Of the 5,000 women who took the oral contraceptive, there was only one more case of a blood-clotting disease than among the 5,000 who did not take the contraceptive; the difference was 1/5000. Even if the null hypothesis (zero increased incidence) were true, differences as large as (or larger than) 1/5000 would occur 40% of the time.28 Hence, the statistical significance of the observed difference in the Fuertes' study is 0.4. Such a result (often reported simply as "not statistically significant") is that do not arise from unambiguous mathematical or scientific considerations are lumped under "policy value" choices. Second, whatever requires considerations of values or "discretion" is thought to fall outside the proper domain of purely scientific expertise. Given both these assumptions, it is not surprising to find the role of the statistical expert reduced to the formal calculation of such things as significance levels.
Such a view, however, is radically divorced from the uses to which statistical tests can be and often are put in reaching such evidential claims as that stated by the FDA Advisory Committee in 1969:
The probability of a series of differences as large or larger than that observed is greater than 0.5. Thus there is no evidence from this material that the risk is enhanced....30 Does the report of a high significance level, then, warrant the assessment "no evidence of increased incidence of hazard"? That admittedly requires going beyond formal statistical reports themselves.
But it does not thereby go beyond the proper domain of statistical-scientific expertise {even if we accept the second assumption excluding policy values from this domain).
What is required to answer such questions is an understanding of the scientific lor evidential) import of a statistical report, and more specifically, the import of "failing to find a statistically significant difference (with a given test)." Although there is much disagreement as to what information such a statistical report provides, these disagreements do not essentially revolve around policy values-at least not if they are correctly understood. These disagreements, rather, concern the metastatistical problem of interpreting negative statistical reports. Statisticians can tell the decisionmaker the probability that the observed result is attributable merely to chance or, in other words, the probability that the result is a 'false positive'; but that is the limit of scientific expertise. Whether a given probability of a 'false positive' result forms an acceptable foundation for a particular regulatory A failure to find a difference in scale reading only indicates the nonexistence of a given increase (in weight) if the instrument used had a reasonable chance of finding a difference were it in fact to exist.
We can apply this principle toward understanding the failure to find a difference more statistically significant than 0.4, where the instrument now is a statistical test. In doing so, a point too often overlooked becomes apparent; namely, not all 0.4 statistically insignificant differences indicate the same absence of increase. What they indicate will vary with the size of increase that the given test had a fairly good chance of detecting; that is, the result will vary with the sensitivity of the test.
In some cases, the sample size may have been so small (relative to the incidence rate of the hazard in question) that the test had a very poor chance of picking up any but the grossest increases. Such an insensitive test can be specified so that it is overwhelmingly likely not to reject the hypothesis H of zero-increase. This might reflect a deliberate desire for the substance tested to get a clean bill of health, or (as is often the case) it may be that a large enough sample is deemed impractical or unethical.32 How then can I maintain that an objective understanding of a test result is possible?
The answer is that it does not matter why the test was specified the way it was at least not for the sake of understanding what increased hazard is or is not indicated by the result. My subjective interest in avoiding a report of weight gain of a given amount may be the reason for my choosing to use a given scale, but one would not suppose that criticizing what the scale really says about my weight gain is a matter of my subjective values as well.
How to Tell the Truth (about Hazard Assessments) with Metastatistics
To illustrate both the problem and the solution that I am recommending, I will describe an imaginary social group whose attitude toward the hazards of oral contraceptives is this: "No increased risk of blood-clotting diseases" should mean that "no more than one additional case of such a disease results for every 10,000 women on the pill" (over a given period). All members of this group demand evidence showing that no more than one additional in 10,000; that is, suppose that oral contraceptives cause, on average, two additional cases of bloodclotting disorders per 10,000 women. But in that case, a result as insignificant (as close to zero) or even more insignificant than the one we obtained (i.e., 2/10,000) would occur 50% of the time.34 Surely, failing to reject the zero-increase claim with the result of the Fuertes' study cannot be taken as ruling out positive increases as small as two in 10,000. The result of the study (0.4 insignificant difference) is just the sort of thing that occurs half the time in studies of substances that cause two additional cases of the disorder per 10,000 women. If such a result were taken as warranting the assessment "The increased incidence of clotting diseases among pill takers is no greater than 2 in 10,000," then it would lead to erroneous assessments 50% of the time.
Such an error is an example of a false negative; a report of a statistically insignificant result is taken as evidence that the increased hazard is no more than some fraction when, in fact, the increase exceeds this fraction. The 50%, in the above example, then, refers to the probability that the Fuertes' data would lead to false negatives of this sort. Although considerable attention is focussed on the frequency of false positives (i.e., on the significance level or p-value of the difference), the frequency of false negatives is rarely reported and often ignored. Yet the frequencies of false negatives afford a crucial tool for understanding what a negative result does and does not "say" about the actual increased hazard.
The manner in which it does so was exemplified above. It was reasoned that a result as insignificant as (or even more insignificant than) the one observed occurs as much as 50% of the time if the increased incidence of hazard is as much as two cases per 10,000 women. Therefore, the observed result is not a good indication that the increased incidence of clotting disease is less than two cases This rule suggests that an insigriificant difference warrants ruling out only those increased hazard case of clotting disorders per 10,000 women is expected before the designation "no significant increased hazard" {with respect to such disorders) is warranted. How well is this minimal policy requirement reflected in the Fuertes' assessment?
If we examine the Fuertes' data, we find that the only "hard scientific facts" are these: nine out of 5,000 women on the oral contraceptive (for ten years) and eight of 5,000 not on them developed blood-clotting diseases. This difference has significance level 0.4, which the Fuertes' study asserts is not deemed significant enough to reject the null hypothesis of zero-increased hazard. If I know a little statistics, then I understand that such a result would occur 40% of the time even if the hypothesis of zero-increase were true. But a member of the interested subgroup might still seek an answer to the question: Does this result constitute evidence that no more than one additional case of the disease would be expected per 10,000 women (on the pill)?
Work on values and public policy asserts only that, beyond the facts, one needs to consult policy values; only policy value considerations can help in interpreting technical statistical results upon which hazard assessments are based. Notice, in this scenario, the subgroup is in possession of the (alleged) facts (further details of the study could be added as well). They also know the policy value that they wish to see reflected in the assessment. Nevertheless, members are still unable to tell how well this value has been reflected in the Fuertes' assessment. Is it possible to do better? Yes, it is. The place to start is with the intuitive principle reached earlier. It alerts the questioner to the underlying increases not ruled out by negative results. As statistician A.W. Edwards warns, Repeated non-rejection of the null hypothesis is too easily interpreted as indicating its acceptance, so that on the basis of no prior information coupled with little observational data, the null hypothesis is accepted.33
In other words, failing to reject the hypothesis of zero-increase is not the same as having positive evidence that the increased hazard is exactly zero. For, very small and even zero differences in the observed effect (between treated and control groups) can occur when the actual increase exceeds zero. In fact, they may occur with great frequency. Suppose, for instance, that the actual increase in the incidence of blood-clotting disorders was two rates that would infrequently give rise to so small a (positive) difference (between treated and control subjects). Although the result of the Fuertes' study fails to rule out increased hazards as small as two in 10,000; it does provide grounds for ruling out increased hazard rates as large as two cases in 1,000 women. Why? Because if the increased hazard were as large as two cases per 1,000, such an insignificant result would occur only 2% of the time (i.e., 98% of the time a larger difference between treated and controls would arise).36 The reasoning is analogous to that of the weighing example: If such a small difference (e.g., in scale reading) would almost never arise using this test (instrument) and if the actual increase in hazard (in weight) were as much as f (e.g., one pound), then observing such a small difference is a good indication that the actual increase was not as large as f. This reasoning is capsulized in the following companion to rule M-l: (M-2): A statistically insignificant difference (in testing H: O-increase) is a good indication that the increased hazard rate is less than some fraction f to the extent that such an insignificant result rarely results from an increase as large as f.37
Implications for Understanding and Criticizing NI-Assessments
The metastatistical rules M-1 and M-2 provide an answer to the question I raised for the imaginary societal group, namely, "Do the Fuertes' data provide good evidence that no more than one additional case of a blood-clotting disease per 10,000 women on the pill is expected?" The answer is no.
According to M-2, the Fuertes' data tell only that there are no grounds to fear that the increased hazard rate is as large as two cases per 1,000 women; but that conclusion does not provide assurance to individuals worried about increased hazard rates as small as one case in 10,000. For, according to M-l, the result was seen to fail to rule out increases of two in 10,000; and, as one would expect, it provides even poorer grounds for ruling out increased hazards of only one in 10,000.38 Suppose that the NI-assessment, based on results such as the Fuertes' study, is stated specifically as "The results indicate no more than 1 additional case of clotting disorders among 10,000 women on the pill is expected." The rule M-1 enables one to show effectively that such an assessment is flawed. Given the study performed and the statistical test applied, the statistical result simply does not warrant ruling out such a small increased hazard; to interpret it as if it does is to misinterpret it.
If the hazard assessment of no-increase (NI) is stated vaguely as "The results indicate no significant (or no relevant) increase in incidence of blood-clotting hazards (among women on the Pill)," then, although these metastatistical rules do not reject such an assessment outright, they may be used to: (i) Ascertain the approximate lower bound that the negative result warrants ruling out39 and use this to check how well subsequent hazard evaluations and policies accord with one's tolerance of hazard; and (ii) Compare this hazard with the lower bound of hazard associated with a different substance by applying M-1 and M-2 to studies of the latter. If data on the latter substance (e.g., cyclamates) are found to indicate an increased hazard no greater than that shown for the former (e.g., oral contraceptives), and yet the latter leads to very different regulatory decisions, then one should be able to point to specific differences in policy values effectively operating in the two cases.
By applying rules M-1 and M-2 to a variety of studies of the sort being considered here, we can gain a real understanding of negative statistical results. Armed with such tools, the public40 will be in a better position to understand controversies based on negative hazard assessments and to distinguish issues of statistical evidence from issues of policy value. Interested individuals may begin to demand, in a way experts understand, that studies be carried out only if they have a reasonable chance of providing sufficient evidence about hazards of interest. For example, if one wanted to ensure that a non-rejection of the null hypothesis in the Fuertes' study would indicate that increases as small as one in 10,000 could be ruled out, the treated and control groups would have to contain approximately one million women each.41 The impracticality of sufficiently large samples may, of course, often force hazard assessments to be made with less complete data, thereby necessitating more subtle statistical considerations in interpreting the data. As I have argued, these considerations are not mere policy value preferences for which expert assessors cannot rightly be challenged.
Ultimately, a system of metastatistical rules may be formulated not only for the assessment of no-increased hazard but also for other types of statistical claims upon which public policies are often based.42 Such metastatistical rules would require information from a great many areas, and hence formulating such rules is a task uniquely suited to the interdisciplinary study of science and society. By taking on this task, such interdisciplinary studies would begin to serve the important function of increasing the public's understanding of, and ability to resolve, policy controversies having serious consequences for society.
